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We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their
belief states by averaging (in a specified way) the belief states of other agents in the community.
The agents in our model have a rich belief state, involving multiple independent issues which are
interrelated in such a way that they form a theory of the world. Our main goal is to calculate the
probability for an agent to end up in an inconsistent belief state due to updating (in the given way).
To that end, an analytical expression is given and evaluated numerically, both exactly and using
statistical sampling. It is shown that, under the assumptions of our model, an agent always has a
probability of less than 2 % of ending up in an inconsistent belief state. Moreover, this probability
can be made arbitrarily small by increasing the number of independent issues the agents have to
judge or by increasing the group size. A real-world situation to which this model applies is a group
of experts participating in a Delphi-study.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Sociophysics studies social phenomena using existing
models from statistical physics, such as the Ising spin
model1 or the concept of active Brownian particles2, or
tailor-made models that are physical in spirit, includ-
ing various multi-agent models3. The use of agent-based
models has become increasingly popular in social dynam-
ics research4,5. The branch of sociophysics we are in-
terested in here is opinion dynamics, which investigates
groups of epistemically interacting agents. There is evi-
dence from psychological experiments that agents adjust
their opinion when they are informed about the opin-
ion of another agent6. Partly inspired by such accounts,
opinion dynamics studies how the opinions or belief states
of agents evolve over time as a result of interactions with
other agents, which may lead to cluster formation, po-
larization, or consensus on the macro-level3. Opinion
dynamics is also of interest for social epistemology—a
branch of philosophy, that focuses on social aspects of
knowledge of beliefs7. It studies, for example, how to
deal with peer disagreement, the best response to which
is found to be context-sensitive; among other factors, it
depends on the goal of the investigation8.
In general, the processes involved in opinion dynamics
are very complex. Apart from analytical results, also
computer simulations of agent-based models are used to
study these large, complex systems. Simulations allow
researchers to perform pseudo-experiments in situations
in which real-life experiments are impossible, impractical,
or unethical to perform. For some seminal contributions
to the field of computational opinion dynamics, see1,9,10.
In most approaches to opinion dynamics, an agent’s
belief state is modelled as an opinion on either a single is-
sue or multiple unrelated issues. We propose a model for
opinion dynamics in which an agent’s belief state consists
of multiple interrelated beliefs. Because of this intercon-
nectedness of the agent’s beliefs, his belief state may be
inconsistent. Consider the statement “It is raining and
it is not raining”. Even if one has no information on the
current weather, one can see that this statement is false:
its logical form is a contradiction, which is always false.
Likewise, if one considers several aspects of the world
simultaneously, one of the resulting theories about the
world—to be made precise below—can be rejected out of
hand as being logically inconsistent.
Our goal is to study the probability that an agent ends
up with an inconsistent belief state. In order to explain
how the beliefs are interrelated, how the agents revise or
update their belief state, and how this leads to the possi-
bility of inconsistency, we briefly review six aspects of our
model: the content of an agent’s opinion, the update rule
according to which agents adjust their own opinion upon
interaction with others, aspects related to the opinion
profile, the time parameter, the group size, and the main
research question. The notions introduced in the current
section will receive a more formal treatment further on.
We compare our model with earlier approaches, in par-
ticular with the arguably best-known model for studying
opinion dynamics, to wit, the Hegselmann–Krause (HK)
model3. In this model, the agents are trying to determine
the value of an unspecified parameter and only hold one
belief about this issue at any point in time. In the most
basic version of the HK model, an agent updates his be-
lief over time by averaging the beliefs of all those agents
who are are within his ‘bound of confidence’; that is, the
agents whose beliefs are not too distant from his own.
The model we present can be regarded as an extension
of the HK model.
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2A. Content of an agent’s opinion
Agent-based models of opinion dynamics come in two
flavors: there are discrete and continuous models. In dis-
crete models1, an agent’s belief is expressed as a bit, 0
or 1 (cf. Ising spin model in physics). The opinion may
represent whether or not an agent believes a certain ru-
mor, whether or not he is in favor of a specific proposal,
whether or not he intends to buy a particular product, or
which party the agent intends to vote for in a two-party
system. This binary system can be generalized into dis-
crete models that allow for more than two belief states
(cf. multi-spin or Potts spin), which makes it possible to
model multiple attitudes towards a single alternative or
to represent preferences among multiple options11,12. In
continuous models3,13, the agents each hold a belief ex-
pressed as a real number between 0 and 1. This may be
used as a more fine-grained version of the discrete mod-
els: to represent the agent’s attitude towards a proposal,
a political party, or the like. In such models, values below
0.5 represent negative attitudes and values above 0.5 are
positive attitudes. Alternatively, the continuous param-
eter may be employed to represent an agent’s estimation
of a current value or a future trend.
These models can be made more realistic by taking
into account sociological and psychological considera-
tions. For instance, they may be extended in a straight-
forward manner to describe agents who hold beliefs on
multiple, independent topics (such as economic and per-
sonal issues14). As such, the models can account for the
observation that agents who have similar views on one
issue (for instance, taste in music) are more likely to talk
about other matters as well (for instance, politics) and
thus to influence each other’s opinion on these unrelated
matters15.16 Nevertheless, it has been pointed out in the
literature that these models are limited in a number of
important respects, at least if they are to inform us about
how real groups of agents interact with one another17,18.
One unrealistic feature of the current models is that the
agents only hold independent beliefs, whereas real agents
normally have much richer belief states, containing not
only numerous beliefs about possibly very different mat-
ters, but also beliefs that are logically interconnected.
In the discrete model that we propose, the belief states
of the agents no longer consist of independent beliefs;
they consist of theories formulated in a propositional lan-
guage (as will be explained in Section II A). We will show
that this extension comes at a cost. Given that the agents
in earlier models hold only a single belief, or multiple, un-
related beliefs, their belief states are automatically self-
consistent. This is not true for our model: some belief
states consisting of interrelated beliefs are inconsistent.
B. Update rule for opinions
The update rule specifies how an agent revises his
opinion from one point in time to the next. A popu-
lar approach is to introduce a bound of confidence. This
notion—which is also called ‘limited persuasion’—was
developed first for continuous models, in particular the
HK model3,19 and was later applied to discrete models as
well12. Moreover, the idea of bounded confidence can be
extended to update rules for belief states which are the-
ories: such an HK-like update rule will be incorporated
into our current model.
There is some empirical evidence for models involv-
ing bounded confidence. In a psychological experiment,
Byrne20 found that when an agent interacts with another
agent, the experience has a higher chance of being re-
warding and thus oft leading to a positive relationship
between the two when their attitudes are similar, as com-
pared to when their attitudes differ. According to this
‘Similarity Attraction Paradigm’, in future contacts, peo-
ple tend to interact more with people who hold opinions
similar to their own. Despite this evidence, some readers
may not regard updating under bounded confidence as
a natural way for individuals to adjust their opinions in
spontaneous, face-to-face meetings. Those readers may
regard the agents as experts who act as consultants in a
Delphi study.21 In such a setting, the agents do not in-
teract directly, but get feedback on each other’s opinions
only via a facilitator. When the facilitator informs each
expert only of the opinion of those other experts that are
within their bound of confidence, an HK-like update rule
seems to apply naturally.
C. Opinion profile
An opinion profile is a way to keep track of how many
agents hold which opinion. This can be done by keeping
a list of names of the agents and writing each agent’s
current opinion behind his name. An anonymous opin-
ion profile can be obtained by keeping a list of possible
opinions and tallying how many agents currently hold a
opinion; we will employ the latter type of profile. Opin-
ion dynamics can be defined as the study of the temporal
evolution of opinion profiles.
D. Time
Many studies in opinion dynamics investigate the evo-
lution of opinion profiles in the long run. Usually, a fixed
point or equilibrium state is reached. Hegselmann and
Krause, for instance, investigate whether iterated updat-
ing will ultimately lead groups of agents to full or par-
tial consensus3. Mas also investigates consensus- versus
cluster-formation, as a function of the sociological make-
up of the group under consideration22.
For sociologists, the behavior of opinion profiles at in-
termediate time steps may be more relevant than its
asymptotic behavior. Research on voting behavior, for
example, should focus on intermediate time steps23; af-
ter all, elections take place at a set date, whether or not
3the opinion profile of the population has stabilized at that
point in time.
In our study, we calculate the probability that an agent
comes to hold an inconsistent opinion by updating. We
do not investigate the mid- or long-term evolution of the
opinion profile, but focus on the opinion profiles resulting
from the very first update. In other words, we consider
the opinion profile at only two points in time: the ini-
tial profile and the profile resulting from one round of
updates.
E. Group size
Another interesting parameter to investigate in opinion
dynamics is the group size. We are interested in updates
which lead to inconsistent opinions, which may occur al-
ready for groups as small as three agents (see Section II D
below). The social brain hypothesis24 states that 150 re-
lations is the maximum people can entertain on average:
Lorenz presents this as an argument to model groups of
agents of about this size25. Whereas this figure seems
moderate from the sociological point of view, this is not
necessarily the case from a mathematical viewpoint. As
observed by Lorenz25 (p. 323), “[c]omplexity arises with
finite but huge numbers of agents.” Therefore, opinion
dynamics is often studied in the limit of infinitely many
agents, which makes it possible to express the equations
in terms of ‘density of agents’. We will not do this in
our current study: because of the previous observations,
we should at least investigate the interval of 3 up to 150
agents.
F. Research question
As we have remarked, the agents in our model may end
up in an inconsistent belief state, even when all agents
start out holding a consistent theory. The main question
to be answered in this paper is: how likely is it that this
possibility will materialize? More exactly, we want to
know what the probability is that an agent will update
to an inconsistent belief state and how this probability
depends on the number of atomic sentences in the agents’
language and on the size of their community. To this end,
an analytical expression is given and evaluated numeri-
cally, both exactly and using statistical sampling. It is
shown that, in our model, an agent always has a probabil-
ity of less than 2 % of ending up in an inconsistent belief
state. Moreover, this probability can be made arbitrarily
small by increasing the number of atomic sentences or by
increasing the size of the community.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the logical frame-
work we assume throughout the paper. Then we spec-
ify the representation of the opinion profile and the em-
ployed update rule. Finally, we relate our work to previ-
ous research on judgment aggregation and the discursive
dilemma.
A. Logical framework
1. Language and consequence relation
The agents in our model will have to judge a number
of independent issues; we use the variable M for this
number (where M ∈ N+). Throughout this section, we
will illustrate our definitions for the case in which M = 2,
the easiest non-trivial example. Each issue is represented
by an atomic sentence. If the agents are bankers, the
issues may be investment proposals; if they are scientists,
the issues may be research hypotheses. As an example,
one atomic sentence could be ‘Magnetic monopoles exist’,
and another ‘It will rain tomorrow’. Atomic sentences
can be combined using three logical connectives: ‘and’,
‘or’, and ‘not’. The collection of sentences that can be
composed in this way is called the language L.
We assume a classical consequence relation for the lan-
guage, which, following standard practice, we denote by
the symbol `. If A is a subset of the language (a set of
sentences) and a is an element of the language (a partic-
ular sentence), then A ` a expresses that a is a logical
consequence of A. That the consequence relation is clas-
sical means that it obeys the following three conditions:
(1) if a ∈ A then A ` a; (2) if A ` a and A ⊆ B then
B ` a; and (3) if A ` a and for all b ∈ A it holds that
B ` b, then B ` a. Semantically speaking, that a is a
logical consequence of A means that, necessarily, if all
the sentences in A are true, then so is a.
2. Possible worlds
If we were to know which of the atomic sentences are
true in the world and which are false, we would know
exactly what the world is like (at least as far as is ex-
pressible in our language, which is restricted to a finite
number of aspects of the world). The point is that our
agents do not know what the world is like. Any possi-
ble combination of true–false assignments to all of the
atomic sentences is a way the world may be, called a
possible world.
Formally, a possible world is an assignment of truth
values to the atomic sentences. Hence, a language with
M atomic sentences allows us to distinguish between
wmax = 2
M possible worlds: there is exactly one pos-
sible world in which all atomic sentences are true; there
are M possible worlds in which all but one of the atomic
sentences are true; there are
(
M
2
)
possible worlds in which
all but two of the atomic sentences are true; and so on.
We may represent a possible world as a sequence of bits
(bit-string). First we have to decide on an (arbitrary) or-
4TABLE I: With M = 2, there are wmax = 2
M = 4 possible
worlds, w = 0, . . . , w = 3.
m = 1 m = 0
w = 0 0 0
w = 1 0 1
w = 2 1 0
w = 3 1 1
der of the atomic sentences. In the bit-string, 1 indicates
that the corresponding atomic sentence is true in that
world, 0 that it is false. Let us illustrate this for the case
in which there are M = 2 atomic sentences: call ‘Mag-
netic monopoles exist’ atomic sentence m = 0 and ‘It
will rain tomorrow’ atomic sentence m = 1. Then there
are wmax = 4 possible worlds, w ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, which
are listed in Table I. Also the numbering of the possi-
ble worlds is arbitrary, but for convenience we read the
sequence of 0’s and 1’s as a binary number. The inter-
pretation of possible world w = 2, for example, is that
sentence m = 0 is false and sentence m = 1 is true: in
this possible world, it holds that magnetic monopoles do
not exist and that it will rain tomorrow.
3. Theories
A theory is a subset of possible worlds.26 Let us explain
this: an agent believes the actual world to be among the
possible worlds that are in his theory; he has excluded the
other possible worlds as live possibilities. To see that a
theory may contain more than one specific possible world,
consider an agent who is sure that ‘Magnetic monopoles
exist’ is false, but has no idea whether ‘It will rain to-
morrow’ is true or false. If these are the only atomic
sentences in his language, the agent holds a theory with
two possible worlds. Given that we can order the possi-
ble worlds, we can represent theories as sequences of 0’s
and 1’s, which in turn can be read as binary numbers.
(This procedure is similar to the one used above for rep-
resenting possible worlds by binary numbers.) Note that
there are tmax = 2
wmax theories that can be formulated
in a language with M atomic sentences.
Table II below illustrates this set-up for the case where
M = 2. In that table, theory t = 0 is the inconsis-
tent theory, according to which all worlds are impossible;
syntactically, it corresponds to a contradiction. We know
beforehand that this theory is false: by ruling out all pos-
sible worlds, it also rules out the actual world. Theory
t = 15 regards all worlds as possible; syntactically, it cor-
responds to a tautology. We know beforehand that this
theory is true—the actual world must be among the ones
that are possible according to this theory—but precisely
for that reason the theory is entirely uninformative. The
other theories are all consistent and of varying degrees of
informational strength. The most informative ones are
those according to which exactly one world is possible; a
little less informative are those according to which two
worlds are possible; and still less informative are the the-
ories according to which three worlds are possible.
In Table II, we have numbered the theories by inter-
preting their bit-string notation as a binary number. The
reverse order of the worlds in the top line is so as to make
world w correspond with the wth bit of the binary repre-
sentation of the theory.
B. Opinion profile
So far, we have focused on the belief state of a single
agent, which is expressed as a theory. Now, we consider a
community of N agents. The agents start out with (pos-
sibly different) information or preferences, and therefore
may vote for different theories initially. The only as-
sumption we make about the agents’ initial belief states
is that they are consistent. Subsequently, the agents are
allowed to communicate and adjust there preference for
a theory accordingly. In particular, we model what hap-
pens when the agents communicate with all other agents
whose belief states are ‘close enough’ to their own—that
are within their bound of confidence, in Hegselmann and
Krause’s terminology—and update their belief state by
‘averaging’ over the close enough belief states, where the
relevant notions of closeness and averaging are to receive
formally precise definitions. The totality of belief states
of a community at a given time can be represented by a
string of tmax numbers, n0, . . . , ntmax−1, where the num-
ber nt indicates how many agents hold theory t at that
time. We may also represent these numbers as a vector,−→n . We refer to this string or vector as the (anonymous)
opinion profile of the community at a specified time. Be-
cause each agent has exactly one belief state, the sum
of the numbers in an opinion profile is equal to the to-
tal number of agents, N . Also, given that initially no
agent has the inconsistent theory as his belief state, n0 is
always zero before any updating has taken place. Later
this may change. By updating, an agent may arrive at the
inconsistent theory; we shall call such an update a zero-
update (because the inconsistent theory is represented by
a string of only 0’s).
In most opinion dynamics studies, a random opinion
profile is used as a starting point. Because our question
deals with a probability in function of the initial opinion
profile, we explicitly take into account all possible initial
opinion profiles, or—where this is not possible—take a
large enough statistical sample out of all possible initial
opinion profiles. The different opinion profiles can be
thought of as resulting from the individual choices the
agents make regarding which world or worlds they deem
possible. Here, we assume that the adoption of a theory
as an initial belief state can be modeled as a sequence of
2M independent tosses of a fair coin, where the agent is
to repeat the series of tosses if the result is a sequence
5TABLE II: With M = 2, there are wmax = 2
M = 4 possible worlds, w = 0, . . . , w = 3, and tmax = 2
wmax = 16 different theories,
t = 0, . . . , t = 15. The penultimate column gives the sum of bits (bit-sum), st, of each theory. The last column represents the
opinion profile of the community.
w = 3 w = 2 w = 1 w = 0 st opinion profile
t = 0 0 0 0 0 0 n0
t = 1 0 0 0 1 1 n1
t = 2 0 0 1 0 1 n2
t = 3 0 0 1 1 2 n3
t = 4 0 1 0 0 1 n4
t = 5 0 1 0 1 2 n5
t = 6 0 1 1 0 2 n6
t = 7 0 1 1 1 3 n7
t = 8 1 0 0 0 1 n8
t = 9 1 0 0 1 2 n9
t = 10 1 0 1 0 2 n10
t = 11 1 0 1 1 3 n11
t = 12 1 1 0 0 2 n12
t = 13 1 1 0 1 3 n13
t = 14 1 1 1 0 3 n14
t = 15 1 1 1 1 4 n15
of only 0’s. As a consequence, all consistent theories
have the same probability—namely, 1/(tmax− 1)—of be-
ing adopted as an initial belief state by an agent. That is
to say, we are studying what in the literature are some-
times referred to as ‘impartial cultures’ (cf. Section II D).
Furthermore, the agents are assumed to choose indepen-
dently of each other.
C. Update rule
Theorists have studied a variety of update rules, de-
pending on the application the authors have in mind.
For instance, to model gossip communication, Deffuant et
al. use a rule in which updates are triggered by pairwise
interactions13. To model group meetings, the updates
should rather be simultaneous within the entire group
of agents. During a conference, the agents meet each
other face-to-face; in that case, additional effects should
be taken into account, such as the ‘primacy effect’, which
demonstrates that the order in which the agents’ opin-
ions are publicly announced may influence how the others
revise their opinion.
As mentioned before, we may think of our group of
agents as a group of scientists, bankers, or other experts
who act as consultants in a Delphi-study. The choices in
the selection of the update rule follow from that. Delphi-
studies are typically conducted in a way such that the
experts do not have any direct interaction27. Thus, we
need a model with simultaneous updating but without
primacy effects: in this respect, the update rule of the
HK model3 applies to this situation in a natural way.
Another relevant aspect of the HK model is that an
agent may not take into account the opinions of all the
agents in the group. This may occur when the agent
knows all the opinions but does not want to take into
account the opinions of agents who hold a view that is too
different from the agent’s own, or because the facilitator
of the Delphi-study only informs the agent about the
opinions of experts who hold an opinion similar to the
agent’s.
In order to quantify what counts as a similar opin-
ion, we introduce the ‘maximal distance’ or ‘bound of
confidence’, D. This parameter expresses the number of
bits that another agent’s opinion may maximally differ
from one’s own if that agent’s opinion is to be taken into
account in the updating process. To quantify the differ-
ence between two theories, we use the so-called Hamming
distance of the corresponding bit-strings, defined as the
number of digits in which these strings differ28.
It is possible to consider heterogeneous populations,
where agents may have different bounds of confidence29.
Because Hegselmann and Krause report no qualitative
difference between the homogeneous and the heteroge-
neous case29, we choose the simpler, homogeneous ap-
proach: D has the same value for all agents in any pop-
ulation we consider. We investigate the influence of the
value of D on the probability of updating to the incon-
sistent theory. By an agent’s ‘neighbors’ we refer to the
agents whose opinions fall within the bound of confidence
of the given agent. Note that, however D is specified, an
agent always counts as his or her own neighbor.
At this point, we still have to specify how agents up-
date on the basis of their neighbors’ belief states. Like
Hegselmann and Krause in most of their studies3,30,31, we
choose the arguably simplest and also the most plausible
averaging method, which is to determine an agent’s new
belief state based on the straight average of his neighbors’
belief states. Our update rule for theories is a bitwise
operation in two steps—averaging and rounding. First,
6each bit is averaged by taking into account the value of
the corresponding bit of an agent’s neighbors. In general,
the result is a value in [0, 1] rather than in {0, 1}. Hence
the need for a second step: in case the average-of-bits is
greater than 12 , the corresponding bit is updated to 1; in
case the average-of-bits is less than 12 , the corresponding
bit is updated to 0; and in case the average-of-bits is ex-
actly equal to 12 , the corresponding bit keeps its initial
value.32
In the current study, we are only interested in the prob-
ability of arriving at an inconsistent conclusion after a
single update. However, again following Hegselmann and
Krause, one could also designate one of the theories ex-
pressible in the agents’ language as the truth and allow
the agents to gather evidence which points toward the
truth. One could then study the interplay between con-
vergence to the truth and avoiding inconsistencies. We
plan to implement this in future research.
We want to keep the model as simple as possible.
Therefore, we will not implement any of the following
additional parameters: trustworthiness of agents, physi-
cal closeness and/or social network9, and other psycho-
logically relevant aspects (such as bias, self-justification,
and getting tired of repeated updating33). Because we
only have one update rule, there is no need to consider
mixed groups and/or agents changing their update rule
over time, which would complicate matters even further.
In general, pure cases have the drawback of being less
realistic, at the benefit of showing more clearly the effect
of a single parameter.
D. Comparison with related work
The possibility of inconsistent outcomes resulting from
a voting procedure, similar to updating beliefs, has al-
ready received some discussion in the literature on the
so-called discursive dilemma. According to majority vot-
ing on a set of interrelated propositions, a proposition
should be made part of the collective judgment if it is
part of a majority of the individual judgments. The dis-
cursive dilemma34,35, which is a more general form of the
doctrinal paradox36, shows that this voting procedure
may result in an inconsistent collective judgment even if
all the individual judgments are consistent. This is im-
mediately relevant to our present concerns, given that
majority voting falls under the definition of averaging to
be employed in our update rule.
The original example of the doctrinal paradox is stated
in the context of a legal court decision. It presents three
judges who have to vote on three propositions: two pre-
misses P and Q, and a conclusion R. The connection
between the premisses and the conclusion is motivated
by legal doctrine and formalized as R↔ (P ∧Q). A vote
is called consistent if it satisfies this rule, and inconsistent
otherwise. Readers will have no difficulty assigning con-
sistent individual judgments to the judges which, given
proposition-wise majority voting, nevertheless give rise
to an inconsistent collective judgment.
In34, it is argued that this type of paradoxical result
can occur in group decisions on interrelated propositions
in other contexts as well. The example can be generalized
to cases with more than two premises34, more than three
judges37, or to cases with a disjunctive connection rule
R↔ (P ∨Q) rather than a conjunctive one37. There are
many impossibility results to be found in the literature35,
that show that—given some plausible conditions—there
is no way of aggregating consistent individual judgments
so as to guarantee a consistent group judgment.
List37 (p. 5) addresses the question of how serious the
threat posed by this paradox is. He gives a probabilistic
analysis of the discursive dilemma. In the general case
of k premisses, P1, . . . , Pk, and one conclusion, R, there
are 2k combinations of the premisses being true or false
(possible worlds). Each time, the truth or falsehood of
the remaining proposition, the conclusion, is determined
by the conjunctive connection rule R ↔ (P1 ∧ · · · ∧ Pk).
The simplest case is that in which all the probabilities
are equal that an agent holds a particular opinion out of
the 2k consistent ones; this situation is called an impar-
tial culture. List37 considers this case as well as variants
thereof. In his paper, he also analyzes the case of an im-
partial anonymous culture, which takes every anonymous
opinion profile to be equally likely (rather than every in-
dividual choice of the agents). Following the literature on
the Condorcet jury theorem, he assumes identical proba-
bilities for all agents and independence between different
agents. The focus of37 is mainly on convergence results
(in particular, on the probability of inconsistency in the
limit of the number of agents going to infinity), although
some results are stated in terms of a finite (but always
odd) number of agents.
While we also intend to give a probabilistic analysis of
the occurrence of inconsistencies in what may be inter-
preted as group judgments and make the result general
for the number of atomic propositions considered by the
agents, there are some differences between our model and
that of List37 that merit highlighting.
First, we want to model agents that—in the termi-
nology of the discursive dilemma—vote on a theory. The
type of inconsistencies encountered in the doctrinal para-
dox can be avoided relatively easily by having the jurors
vote either on the premisses only (and then derive the
conclusion from the collective judgments on the premises)
or on the conclusion only34. For voting on theories, which
are by definition closed under derivability, there is no
quick fix available to avoid the problem that agents reach
the inconsistent theory by majority voting (or, in our
terms, updating by averaging). Therefore, the question
regarding the probability of this event seems all the more
pressing.
Second, we are interested in calculating the probability
of an inconsistency for a completely general number of
agents (odd as well as even), rather than in convergence
results (in the limit of infinitely many agents).
And third, rather than considering majority voting
7where the relevant majority has to be relative to the
whole group of agents, we assume an update rule that ad-
mits of greater and smaller bounds of confidence, which
effectively comes to requiring a majority only relative to
a subgroup of agents. This also implies that if one agent
comes to hold an inconsistent theory, this need not be so
for all agents in the group.
On a more practical level, we note that, because we al-
ready take into consideration three parameters (number
of atomic sentences, number of agents, and the bound
of confidence parameter related to the update rule), we
confine our discussion to impartial cultures.
III. THE PROBABILITY OF
INCONSISTENCIES
We now turn to the question of how probable it is that
an agent with a consistent initial belief state updates to
the inconsistent belief state by averaging the (also ini-
tially consistent) belief states of that agent’s neighbors.
More precisely, we consider a fixed update rule—a fixed
way of averaging belief states—and study the effects on
the said probability of the following parameters:
1. the number M of atomic sentences of the agents’
language;
2. the number N of agents in the community;
3. the bound of confidence, D, which is the maxi-
mal Hamming distance for one agent to count as
a neighbor of another.
The analytical solution consists of many nested sums. In
the next section, we evaluate the analytical expression
numerically. Because exact calculations are only feasible
for small populations, we extend the calculations by a
simulation based on statistical sampling.
Given M atomic sentences, N agents, and a maxi-
mal Hamming distance or bound of confidence D, we
want to calculate, first, the fraction of agents who up-
date to the contradiction, when we consider all agents in
all possible initial opinion profiles, FAG(M,N,D); and
second, the fraction of all possible opinion profiles that
have at least one agent who updates to the contradiction,
FOP(M,N,D). In other words, FAG(M,N,D) is the
probability for an agent to update to the inconsistent the-
ory in a single update under the assumption that nothing
is known about the opinion profile—only the parameters
M , N , and D are known. Likewise, FOP(M,N,D) is the
probability that at least one agent in the entire popu-
lation will update to the inconsistent theory in a single
update. Clearly, the latter probability should be at least
as great as the former.
Readers who are interested in the details of the deriva-
tion of the analytical expressions for these probabilities
are referred to the appendix. Here, we state the result
of the derivation, introduce previously undefined param-
eters occurring in it, and clarify the overall form of the
expressions for FAG(M,N,D) and FOP(M,N,D):
FAG(M,N,D) =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−(n1+n2+···+ntmax−3)∑
ntmax−2=0
N !
n0!n1! · · ·ntmax−1!
×
1
(tmax − 1)N
tmax−1∑
t=0
(
nt
N
wmax−1∏
w=0
INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉])
; (1a)
FOP(M,N,D) =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−(n1+n2+···+ntmax−3)∑
ntmax−2=0
N !
n0!n1! · · ·ntmax−1!
×
1
(tmax − 1)N ZUP(M,N,D,
−→n ). (1b)
Because these expressions take the form of nested sums,
in order to explain them, we should start by looking
at the last part, which is the actual core of the equa-
tion. The expression for the population-based fraction,
FOP(M,N,D), is very similar to that for FAG(M,N,D)
except for that most central part. First we look at the
expression for the agent-based fraction, FAG(M,N,D).
At the heart of the expression for FAG(M,N,D), we
find the function
〈
Bw(t)
〉
, which specifies how a given
agent in a fixed opinion profile updates the bits of his
theory: it calculates the average of the wth bit for an
agent in opinion profile −→n with bound of confidence D
whose initial opinion is theory t. Because we can do this
for all bits, we can determine whether or not this agent
updates to the inconsistent theory; the expression
wmax−1∏
w=0
INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉]
(2)
evaluates to 1 if this is the case, and to 0 otherwise.
As a next step, we need to count the zero-updates for
all the agents in the opinion profile, not just for one:∑tmax−1
t=0 sums over all possible initial opinions and the
factor nt takes into account how many agents hold each
of these opinions initially. We divide by N for normal-
ization.
Moreover, we need to take into account all different,
anonymous opinion profiles −→n , not just a particular one:
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−(n1+n2+···+ntmax−3)∑
ntmax−2=0
sums over all possible anonymous opinion profiles. Thus,
at the right-hand side of these summations, all the nt’s
have a fixed value, meaning that there, the full opinion
profile, −→n , is specified. The weight factor N !n0!n1!···ntmax−1!
takes into account that certain individual choices of
agents result in the same anonymous opinion profile.
8With this weight factor, we consider an impartial culture;
omitting it would result in an impartial anonymous cul-
ture (see also37). The remaining factor 1
(tmax−1)N is yet
another normalization factor: it divides the result by the
number of different (non-anonymous) opinion profiles.
We have seen that for the agent-fractions, the central
expression (2) calculates the fraction of agents in the par-
ticular opinion profile −→n which perform a zero-update.
Let us now look at the opinion-based fractions: there,
the central expression is replaced by
ZUP(M,N,D,−→n ),
which evaluates to 1 if the corresponding agent-based
term (2) is non-zero, and to 0 otherwise. Be-
cause the rest of the expression for FAG(M,N,D)
and FOP(M,N,D) is identical, this ensures that
FAG(M,N,D) ≤ FOP(M,N,D).
IV. NUMERICAL EVALUATION OF THE
PROBABILITY OF INCONSISTENCY
It is far from trivial to estimate the outcome of the
expressions for FAG(M,N,D) and FOP(M,N,D) or to
analyze their limiting behavior as N and/or M become
large. To obtain an idea of the quantitative output and
qualitative behavior of the formulae, we evaluate them
numerically.
A. Exact calculations
Because the number of computations required to eval-
uate Equation (1) is considerable, we have written a com-
puter program (in Object Pascal) capable of evaluating
the expression for the number of atomic sentences M = 1
to M = 3.38 Here we summarize the results.
If M is equal to 1, there are no opinion profiles in which
any agent updates to the contradiction, no matter which
values N and D have. For M = 2, we obtained exact
results for N = 2 up to N = 21, as shown in Panels A
and C of Figure 1. For M = 3, we could obtain exact
results for N = 1 up to N = 4, as shown in Panels B and
D of Figure 1.
If D = 1 or N = 2, a zero-update never occurs. For
D > wmax = 2
M , the number of zero-updates is equal to
that for D = 2M (data not shown). Because for values of
D = 2M onward, all agents have all other agents as their
neighbors, increasing D further makes no difference.
The lowest values for M , N , and D that may result
in a zero-update are: M = 2, N = 3, and D = 2. (In
agreement with the doctrinal paradox, we find that a
zero-update can occur for three agents.) This is a case
that can be checked on paper, and can thus be used for
testing the validity of the analytical expression and the
program. Checking an example by hand is also a good
way to get to understand the model better.
For M = 2, we can consult Table II. We see that there
are four theories with a bit-sum st = 1: t = 1, t = 2, t = 4
and t = 8. The distance, d, between any two of these the-
ories equals 2. Consider an opinion profile with one agent
holding t = 1, one agent holding t = 2, and one agent
holding t = 4. If D > 2, then all agents are each others’
neighbors. Therefore, to update, they all take the same
average: 13
(
(t = 1) + (t = 2) + (t = 4)
)
=
(
0, 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
.
After rounding, their new opinion becomes (0, 0, 0, 0);
that is, they all arrive at t = 0, the inconsistent the-
ory. For N = 3, populating three out of four of the
theories t = 1, t = 2, t = 4, and t = 8 may hap-
pen in four different ways (given anonymity). If we keep
track of the identity of the agents within each of these
four opinion profiles, the agents may choose their belief
states in six different ways, giving rise to 4× 6 = 24 non-
anonymous configurations that lead at least one agent,
and thereby in fact all agents, to the inconsistent the-
ory in just one update. For M = 2 and N = 3, there
are 3 375 possible non-anonymous opinion profiles; with
D = 2, the aforementioned 24 opinion profiles are the
only starting points from which to arrive at the incon-
sistent theory. Therefore, the opinion-profile-fraction is
FOP(2, 3, 2) = 24/3 375 = 0.711 %. Because all three
agents update to the inconsistent theory, the agent-
fraction is exactly equal to this: FAG(2, 3, 2) = 0.711 %.
These results are identical to the calculated value repre-
sented in the graphs.
For D = 3 and D = 4, the previous four anonymous
(or 24 non-anonymous) configurations still lead to a zero-
update, but there are additional possibilities which lead
to the same result, to wit, those in which one agent oc-
cupies one of the six theories that have bit-sum st = 2
(namely, t = 3, t = 5, t = 6, t = 9, t = 10, and t = 12)
and the other two agents each occupy a theory of bit-
sum 1 such that the single 1-bit of the latter corresponds
with a 0 in the first agent’s theory. For instance, the
combination of one agent holding t = 3 with another
holding t = 4 and the third holding t = 8 leads to an
average of 13
(
(t = 3) + (t = 4) + (t = 8)
)
=
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
,
which becomes t = 0 after rounding. As is readily seen,
higher bounds of confidence and larger population sizes
soon become too complex to check by hand. That is why
computer calculations are indispensable for this type of
research.
As for agent fractions, for M = 2 (Panel A of Fig-
ure 1), all curves have a similar peak shape. The values
for D = 3 and D = 4 are very similar, and almost double
as compared to those for the smaller bound of confidence
D = 2. The former curves exhibit an ‘odd–even wobble’
near the top: for an odd number of agents a larger frac-
tion of the population updates to the inconsistent theory
than one would expect based on the behavior of even-
numbered groups of similar size.
For M = 3 (Panel B), it is clear again that higher max-
imal distances give rise to higher fractions. Also the odd–
even wobble seems present, especially for higher maximal
distances, but we need more data to confirm this.
9FIG. 1: (Color online) Results of exact calculations. The number M of atomic sentences equals 2 in the graphs at the left hand
side (A, C, and E), and 3 in those at the right (B, D, and F). All graphs are presented as a function of the number of agents,
N . The different curves in each graph represent different bounds of confidence, D. (A, B) Fraction (%) of agents who update
to the inconsistent theory. (C, D) Fraction (%) of opinion profiles with at least one agent who updates to the inconsistent
theory. (E, F) Computation time on one CPU in seconds on a semi-logarithmic scale.
As for opinion profile fractions, for M = 2 (Panel C),
the curves D = 3 and D = 4 again exhibit an odd–even
wobble. Curiously, here the trend is opposite to that
observed in Panel B: for an even number of agents a larger
fraction of the population updates to the inconsistent
theory than one would expect based on the behavior of
odd-numbered groups of similar size. Furthermore, D =
3 and D = 4 are not as similar as is the case in panel
B: for D = 3, the wobble decreases as the curve attains
a maximum or plateau, whereas for D = 4 the wobble
only decreases along with the overall amplitude decrease
of the curve.
The onset of the curves for M = 3 (Panel D) seems to
indicate a similar reversed odd–even wobble, but again
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we need more data to confirm this.
Finally, a word on computing time: Although exact
results for higher numbers of agents than shown here are
attainable in principle, they come with ever increasing
computational costs. Panels E and F of Figure 1—note
the log-scale on the vertical axis—show that the required
computing time increases nearly exponentially with the
number of agents. For M = 3, we have extrapolated
the computing time to N = 5 for D = 1 and D = 8,
and found that one additional data point would require
about 5 (for D = 1) to 21 (for D = 8) days of computa-
tion. Of course, these results are machine-dependent, but
the exponential trend is intrinsic, since it is related to the
fast increase in the number of terms in Equation (1). Ob-
taining more data is thus limited by practical constraints,
unless we approach the problem differently.
B. Extending the numerical analysis by statistical
sampling
Instead of constructing all possible opinion profiles and
counting how many agents update to the inconsistent
theory, we now consider a statistical approach: we have
adapted the program used for calculating the exact re-
sults of the previous section to draw a random sample
from all possible opinion profiles and calculate the frac-
tions of agents and opinion profiles within the sample
that update to the inconsistent theory. If the sample size
is sufficiently large, these sample fractions are good esti-
mates of the respective fractions in the complete set of
opinion profiles.
We have done tests with different sample sizes, looking
for a good trade-off between low noise on the data and ac-
ceptably low computational costs. All results presented
in Figure 2 were obtained using samples of 103 sets of 103
opinion profiles each, that is 106 opinion profiles in total
per data point. (Smaller sample sizes such as 104 opinion
profiles per data point require a computation that is 100
times faster, but produce curves that are visibly noisy.)
Because we have some exact results, we can use these
to assess the statistical program: the onset of the curves
in panels A–D of Figure 2 corresponds well with the data
presented in the respective panels of Figure 1.
As can be seen in panels E and F of Figure 2, the com-
putation time increases at first, but then remains almost
constant: a typical calculation no longer depends on the
number of agents, N , but only on M and D. (The out-
liers are due to periods of standby time of the computer
that was used for the calculations.) Thus, the approach
with statistical sampling makes it possible to investigate
the curves up to a much higher value of N than using the
exact formula.
We have plotted the curves for M = 2 up to N = 200,
where all the curves have long passed their maximum and
are decreasing smoothly. For M = 3, we have plotted the
curves up to N = 2 500, because the maximum for D = 6
is only obtained at aroundN = 1 800. Because the curves
are smooth (apart from the odd–even wobble), instead of
computing every point, from N = 110 onwards we have
increased the step size to ∆N = 100.
First let us first examine the odd–even wobble that we
noticed in the onset of the curves from the exact calcu-
lations.
For M = 2, in Figure 2.A we see that for the agent-
based fractions, the oscillation is only present for low
N -values. In Figure 2.C, we see that for D = 2 there is
no odd–even wobble. For D = 3, it is present before the
maximum in the curve, but not beyond it. For D = 4,
the oscillation is well pronounced throughout the curve,
although the amplitude of the oscillation diminishes as
the curve drops.
For M = 3, in the agent-based fractions in Figure 2.B
we see no odd–even wobble in the decreasing tails of
the curves. Figure 3 provides a detail of the curves in
panel D for the region near the origin where all curves
overlap. There is no wobble visible for D ∈ {2, . . . , 5}.
For D = 6, there is an oscillation for N up to about 30
(long before the curve attains its maximum). For D = 8,
the oscillation seems to go on for all values of N (much
like curve D = 4 for M = 2). Because the start of curve
D = 7 overlaps with that of D = 8, we present the for-
mer in a separate graph (cf. Figure 4). D = 7 is the only
case in which we can see an amplitude modulation (like
that in interfering sound waves, where the phenomenon
is known as ‘beats’): the oscillation seems to disappear
at about N = 34 but its amplitude increases again for
larger N until N = 100. There, a new oscillation starts,
but since we have lowered the sampling from thereon to
∆N = 100, we cannot examine it further. We realize
that this odd–even wobble cries out for an explanation.
Currently, however, we have no conclusive explanation
for it, so we present it as a puzzle.
Let us now consider the positions for which the vari-
ous curves become maximal. This is a worst-case anal-
ysis, because the maximal fractions correspond to situa-
tions with the highest probability for an agent to obtain
the inconsistent theory by following the studied update
rule, and for a population to have at least one agent
who updates to the inconsistent theory. In Table III
and Table IV, the maximal fractions for M = 2 and
M = 3 are listed in terms of agents and opinion profiles,
respectively.39 From the table, we see that compared to
M = 2, for M = 3 the maximum occurs for larger N .
Moreover, the percentage at the maximum is much larger
for the opinion-profile-based fractions, but much smaller
for the agent-based ones.
At first blush, this may seem a strange combination, so
let us explain what is going on here: looking at the set of
all possible opinion profiles (for the same N), there is a
certain number of them that contains at least one agent
who updates to the inconsistent theory. However, as the
population grows larger, the average number of agents
who update to the inconsistent theory decreases. Zero-
updates require ‘asymmetrical’ opinion profiles, with all
agents more or less evenly distributed at the lower bit-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Results of calculations based on statistical sampling, consisting of 1 000 sets of 1 000 opinion profiles
each. (A, B) Fraction (%) of agents who update to the inconsistent theory. (C, D) Fraction (%) of opinion profiles with at
least one agent who updates to the inconsistent theory. (E, F) Computation time on one CPU in seconds (linear scale). The
number M of atomic sentences is two in the graphs at the left hand side (A, C, and E), and three in those at the right (B,
D, and F). All graphs are presented as a function of the number N of agents. The different curves in each graph represent
different bounds of confidence, D.
sum theories. (Recall the example forM = 2 andN = 3.)
However, if there are many more agents than theories,
N  tmax, then there are many more combinations of
individual choices that lead to a situation with a simi-
lar number of agents at each theory (low and high bit-
sum) than there are combinations which produce opinion
profiles with the agents primarily present at low-bit-sum
theories. This is a consequence of the statistical law of
large numbers: due to symmetry reasons, in the ‘average
opinion profile’ (each possible belief state instantiated by
N/(tmax−1) agents) no zero-updates are possible and, as
N increases, the probability of an initial opinion profile
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Detail of Panel D in Figure 2: fraction
(%) of opinion profiles with at least one agent who updates
to the inconsistent theory in the case where M = 3.
FIG. 4: (Color online) Separate graph of maximal distance
D = 7: fraction (%) of opinion profiles with at least one
agent who updates to the inconsistent theory in the case where
M = 3.
being close to the average opinion profile also increases.
Thus, large interacting groups act as a protective envi-
ronment to keep the belief states of the group members
consistent.
The general impression of the obtained agent- and
opinion-profile-based curves in Figure 2 is that they vary
smoothly in N . It seems that their behavior can be de-
scribed effectively by an equation that has a substantially
simpler form than Equation (1). We tried to fit a con-
tinuous function to the discrete curves in Figure 2: the
results are presented in the Supporting Information.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented what can plausibly be regarded as
an extension of the HK model, which currently is the
most popular model for studying the dynamics of epis-
TABLE III: Maximal probability of obtaining the inconsistent
theory after one update expressed as fraction (%) of agents.
M D N FAG (%)
2 1 / /
2 2 6 1.0081
2 3 3 1.7824
2 4 5 1.8112
3 1 / /
3 2 22 0.0462
3 3 14 0.1368
3 4 11 0.2380
3 5 15 0.2986
3 6 13 0.3210
3 7 19 0.3215
3 8 13 0.3202
TABLE IV: Maximal probability of obtaining the inconsistent
theory after one update expressed as fraction (%) of opinion
profiles.
M D N FOP (%)
2 1 / /
2 2 15 6.2930
2 3 15 6.4298
2 4 6 5.5932
3 1 / /
3 2 44 1.0805
3 3 37 2.5250
3 4 59 6.0837
3 5 235 15.633
3 6 1780 16.867
3 7 10 1.3213
3 8 8 1.3079
temically interacting agents. The extension consisted
of equipping the agents with the capability of holding
belief states significantly richer than the single beliefs
the agents in the HK model have. As we pointed out,
and as already followed from earlier work on the discur-
sive dilemma, the extension has a price (apart from the
greater mathematical and computational complexity), to
wit, updating is not guaranteed to preserve consistency
of an agent’s belief state. The main goal of this paper
was to measure this price by determining the probability
that an agent in our model indeed updates to the incon-
sistent theory. We investigated the effect on this proba-
bility of three key parameters: the number of agents in
a community; the number of atomic sentences taken into
consideration by the agents; and the bound of confidence,
determining which agents count as an agent’s neighbors.
Taking a social engineering perspective, and based on
our results, one can make the following general recom-
mendations for avoiding a zero-update: (i) make (if pos-
sible) the number M of atomic sentences large; (ii) avoid
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(if possible) even-numbered groups of agents; (iii) for a
given M , choose (if possible) the number N of agents
well below or above the maximum in the curves such as
are given in Figure 2 for the specific cases of M = 2 and
M = 3; and (iv) let (if possible) the agents adopt either a
very low or a very high bound of confidence, D, relative
to 2M .
As we have seen, apart from the trivial cases with
N = 2 or M = 1, the probability for an agent (or a popu-
lation) to reach the inconsistent theory after one update
is always non-zero given the update rule we considered.
But the good news is that an agent always has a proba-
bility < 2% of ending up in the inconsistent belief state.
By making either the number of agents or the number
of atomic sentences large enough, this probability can be
made arbitrarily small. Seen on the scale of the whole
population, the probability that one agent ends up with a
contradiction is—of course—more complex; however, for
sufficiently large populations, that value also decreases
with N .
Because the update rule of our model seems to apply
naturally to the case of a group of experts participat-
ing in a Delphi-study, the recommendations derived from
this model may be useful in the design of a Delphi-study
in which the experts have to state their preferences in
the form of a theory. It may well be that the recom-
mendations made here to lower the probability of incon-
sistencies differ from those that promote other desired
features of communication among agents, such as their
ability to converge to the truth. Because the present
model is a very simple one, we do not claim to have cap-
tured all relevant aspects of opinion-revision of experts in
Delphi-studies or of real-life communication of scientists
or people in general. However, while a limited number of
variables makes it easier to investigate and interpret the
outcomes obtained in a model, we intend to investigate in
future research the effect of some other parameters that
have been held fixed in the present study.
In particular, our current model is void of informa-
tion, in the sense that the agents have no means of gath-
ering information on the actual the state of the world.
In other words, we have not specified which theory of
the world corresponds to the actual state of the world.
However, recall that one can identify “It is raining and
it is not raining” as a contradiction, without knowing
anything about the weather. Likewise, one can iden-
tify the inconsistent theory, without knowing anything
about the actual world. Thus, even in the absence of
information, social aggregation on logically interrelated
issues may yield an outcome, which is undesirable on
purely logical grounds. In the current study, we have in-
vestigated the occurrence of this undesirable outcome in
isolation, without any contingent information present in
the system. In future work, we will study agents who can
obtain (partial) information about the true theory of the
world. The current study on an information-free system
will then serve as a benchmark to isolate one aspect of
the agents’ interaction.
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Appendix: Derivation of analytical expressions
This appendix describes how Equation (1) for the
agent- and population-based fraction of zero-updates is
derived. In the course of this derivation, notions such as
‘possible world’, ‘opinion profile’, and ‘update rule’ which
have been introduced in the main text in informal terms
receive a formal definition applicable to our model.
First, we take the M atomic sentences to be numbered
(arbitrarily) from 0 to M − 1. We can thus characterize
possible worlds by means of bit-strings of length M : if
the bit bm(w), with m ∈ {0, . . . ,M − 1}, is 1/0, the
atomic sentence m is true/false in world w. There are
wmax = 2
M such bit-strings.
These 2M bit-strings of length M can be numbered as
well, most conveniently by their binary value. Each agent
is in a particular belief state, which can be thought of as
a set of worlds that the agent deems possible. Thus, the
belief state of an agent can be represented as a longer
bit-string of length wmax = 2
M with a single bit for
each world equal to 1 or 0 depending on whether the
agent deems that world possible or not. This results in
tmax = 2
wmax = 22
M
different theories and thus, corre-
spondingly, possible belief states. Each theory t, with
t ∈ {0, . . . , tmax−1}, can be written as wmax bits, Bw(t),
with w ∈ {0, . . . , wmax − 1}, such that:
t =
wmax−1∑
w=0
Bw(t) 2
w.
One readily verifies that, given this notation, theory t =
tmax−1 assigns 1 to all possible worlds indeed, and t = 0
assigns 0 to all possible worlds.
The sum of bits of a theory t—the ‘bit-sum’, written
as st—indicates the number of bits equal to 1 in theory
t. This can be stated formally as follows:
st =
wmax−1∑
w=0
Bw(t).
Recall that, to specify the entire community of all N
agents and their belief states, we can count the num-
ber of agents whose belief states are represented by a
given theory t and denote it as nt ∈ {0, . . . , N}, with∑tmax−1
t=0 nt = N . Hence, the entire opinion profile is
specified by40
−→n = 〈n0, n1, . . . , ntmax−1〉.
Recall further that, because the inconsistent theory t = 0
is excluded as an initial belief state for all agents, n0 is
always 0 in the initial opinion profile.
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To determine the new opinion profile of the whole com-
munity of agents after one update, we first formalize how
a single ‘reference’ agent updates his belief state, tref , on
the basis of the belief states of the other agents in the
community.
As a first step, the reference agent has to calculate the
Hamming distance of the bit-string representing his be-
lief state, tref , to that of the bit-strings representing the
belief states of the other agents. The Hamming distance
between tref and another bit-string t is equal to the bit-
sum of the difference bit-string, which can be found by
applying an exclusive-or (XOR) operator: t XOR tref .
Whereas this operation is familiar in information theory,
here we prefer the equivalent algebraic procedure of per-
forming a bit-wise addition followed by modulo 2:
d(t, tref) =
wmax−1∑
w=0
((
Bw(t) +Bw(tref)
)
mod2
)
.
In a community with opinion profile −→n , the number
of agents with a belief state at a distance d from tref is
called ad(tref ,
−→n ):
ad(tref ,
−→n ) =
tmax−1∑
t=0
nt δd,d(t,tref ),
where δd,d(t,tref ) is a Dirac delta, which is 0 if the two
indices are different and 1 if they are equal.
Now, the reference agent may count the number
of agents A within his or her bound of confidence,
d(t, tref) 6 D (which, it will be recalled, necessarily in-
cludes him- or herself) as follows:
A =
D∑
d=0
ad(tref ,
−→n ) = a0(tref ,−→n ) + . . .+ aD(tref ,−→n ).
The next step is to determine how to update any spe-
cific bit in the reference agent’s belief state, Bw(tref). To
stay as close as possible to the HK model, the agents
in our model take the arithmetic mean (straight average)
over the corresponding bits of the belief states of all their
neighbors. We denote the average using angle brackets:41
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
=
1
A
D∑
d=0
tmax−1∑
t=0
Bw(t) nt δd,d(t,tref ). (A.1)
Based on the above average, the agent decides how to
update the value of the wth bit. If the average is smaller
than 12 , the agent sets this bit to 0; if it is larger than
1
2 , to 1; and if it is precisely equal to
1
2 , the agent will
keep his or her initial value for that bit. So, in a sense,
we have majority voting here, with the important proviso
that the majority is taken relative to an agent’s neighbors
and not (necessarily) relative to all agents in his or her
community.
The update rule for the wth bit of an agent who initially
holds theory tref is formalized as a function UPD:
UPD
[〈
Bw(tref)
〉]
=
1 if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
> 12
Bw(tref) if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
= 12
0 if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
< 12 .
(A.2)
To make counting zero-updates more convenient, we
introduce a function INV (for ‘inverse’) that has value 1
if the corresponding updated bit is equal to 0 and vice
versa:
INV
[〈
Bw(tref)
〉]
=
0 if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
> 12
1−Bw(tref) if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
= 12
1 if
〈
Bw(tref)
〉
< 12 .
An update to the contradiction corresponds to updating
all bits to 0. We can count those events by multiplying
the result of INV over all bits: due to the former defini-
tion, this product will only be 1 if all bits are updated
to 0.
In order to determine the opinion-profile-based frac-
tion, we introduce a function ZUP (for ‘zero-update’)
that is 1 if there is at least one agent in the community
who updates to the contradiction, and 0 otherwise:
ZUP(M,N,D,−→n ) = 0 if
∑tmax−1
t=0
(
nt
N
∏wmax−1
w=0 INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉])
= 0
1 if
∑tmax−1
t=0
(
nt
N
∏wmax−1
w=0 INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉])
> 0.
At this point, we can determine the agent- and opinion-
profile-based fractions of zero-updates, FAG(M,N,D)
and FOP(M,N,D), by summing over all combinations
of the agents’ belief states, −→n . Because each theory t,
with t ∈ {0, . . . , tmax − 1}, is equally likely to be chosen
by all agents, we need to sum over all possible combina-
tions of choices. For the sum-indices we use the following
notation: t(n) is the theory representing agent n’s initial
belief state. The requisite functions can then be written
as follows:
FAG(M,N,D) =
tmax−1∑
t(0)=1
· · ·
tmax−1∑
t(N−1)=1
1
(tmax − 1)N ×
tmax−1∑
t=0
(
nt
N
wmax−1∏
w=0
INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉])
;
(A.3a)
FOP(M,N,D) =
tmax−1∑
t(0)=1
· · ·
tmax−1∑
t(N−1)=1
1
(tmax − 1)N ×
ZUP(M,N,D,−→n ). (A.3b)
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Because the number of terms is equal to the number of
ways the agents can choose a theory as their belief state,
that is42 (p. 55),
PR(tmax − 1, N) = (tmax − 1)N ,
each term is weighted by the inverse of this.
Equation (A.3) does not have the exact same form
as Equation (1). To simplify the evaluation of
FAG(M,N,D) and FOP(M,N,D), we can reduce the
number of terms drastically by only summing over all
different anonymous opinion profiles and introducing an
additional weight function (multiset coefficient—see42,
p. 55) N !n0!n1!···ntmax−1! :
43
FAG(M,N,D) =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−(n1+n2+···+ntmax−3)∑
ntmax−2=0
N !
n0!n1! · · ·ntmax−1!
×
1
(tmax − 1)N
tmax−1∑
t=0
(
nt
N
wmax−1∏
w=0
INV
[〈
Bw(t)
〉])
;
FOP(M,N,D) =
N∑
n1=0
N−n1∑
n2=0
· · ·
N−(n1+n2+···+ntmax−3)∑
ntmax−2=0
N !
n0!n1! · · ·ntmax−1!
×
1
(tmax − 1)N ZUP(M,N,D,
−→n ).
This concludes the derivation of Equation (1).
The number of terms in Equation (1) is the multiset co-
efficient, which represents the number of ways to choose
N out of tmax − 1 with repetition (see42 p. 55):
CR(tmax − 1, N) =
(
N + tmax − 1− 1
N
)
=
(N + tmax − 2)!
(N)!(tmax − 2)! .
This number is smaller than or equal to the number of
terms in Equation (A.3), PR(tmax − 1, N).44
Supplementary Information: Fitting curves to the
statistical data
We tried to fit different asymmetric peak shapes—
such as Poisson, Weibull and log-normal—to the data
series presented in Figure 2. The fitting procedure was
performed with commercial software (SigmaPlot). Al-
though no single equation resulted in least-square fits
with good R2 values for (almost) all agent- and opinion-
profile-based D-curves, a three parameter log-normal dis-
tribution gave the best overall result. Its distribution
TABLE V: M = 2. Values of R2 and the three fit parameters
with standard error for a log-normal fit to the agent- and
opinion-profile-based D-curves, for an even and odd number
of agents.
FAG at even positions
D 2 3 4
R2 0.946 0.9736 0.9317
A 0.0157 ± 0.0004 0.0099 ± 0.0002 0.0152 ± 0.0004
B 0.4750 ± 0.015 0.3654 ± 0.0094 0.5110 ± 0.017
C 9.0200 ± 0.42 7.8600 ± 0.22 9.3900 ± 0.50
FAG at odd positions
D 2 3 4
R2 0.9975 0.9988 0.9982
A 0.0102 ± 7E-5 0.0181 ± 9E-5 0.0182 ± 0.0001
B 0.4051 ± 0.0035 0.6744 ± 0.0047 0.6169 ± 0.0052
C 6.8190 ± 0.076 4.6630 ± 0.085 4.7780 ± 0.095
FOP at even positions
D 2 3 4
R2 0.9892 0.9516 0.9516
A 0.0660 ± 0.0008 0.0651 ± 0.0009 0.0500 ± 0.0015
B 0.3342 ± 0.0050 0.5770 ± 0.014 0.4230 ± 0.014
C 14.440 ± 0.20 16.280 ± 0.50 8.0300 ± 0.35
FOP at odd positions
D 2 3 4
R2 0.9898 0.9934 0.9982
A 0.0663 ± 0.0008 0.0639 ± 0.0003 0.0182 ± 0.0001
B 0.3320 ± 0.0048 0.5444 ± 0.0045 0.6169 ± 0.0052
C 14.510 ± 0.20 18.240 ± 0.18 4.7780 ± 0.095
function is given by:
f(N) = Ae
− 12
(
log N
C
B
)2
The goal of a least-squares fit is to determine the values of
the parameters—here A, B, and C—such that the sum
of the squares of the distance between the data points
and the value of the fit-curve is minimal.
To avoid deterioration of the fit quality due to the odd–
even wobble, we have split the data sets into separate files
for the values at odd and at even numbers of agents prior
to the fitting procedure. The results for all odd and even,
agent- and opinion-profile-based D-curves can be found
in Table V for M = 2 and in Table VI for M = 3. For
M = 2, R2 > 0.9 for all curves. For M = 3, there
are eight curves with R2 < 0.9, five of which with R2
between 0.8 and 0.9. For the three remaining cases with
R2 < 0.8 (FAG for N odd and D = 2, FOP for N even
and D = 7, and FOP for N odd and D = 8) the values
for the parameters A, B, and C are not shown.
A graphical representation of the case where M = 3
can be found in Figure 5. These curves suggest a re-
lation among the obtained parameter values, especially
for the agent-based curves. For instance, the fit param-
eters for the even and odd case correspond well for low
D-values, but diverge at higher values, and more drasti-
cally so ranging from parameter A over B to C. In all
curves, the behavior changes at D = 5 or D = 6. For the
agent-data, parameter A starts off with a linear trend in
D, reaching a plateau from D = 5 on. For the opinion
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TABLE VI: M = 3. Values of R2 and the three fit parameters (with standard error) for a log-normal fit to the agent- and
opinion-profile-based D-curves, for an even and odd number of agents.
FAG at even positions
D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R2 0.9982 0.9956 0.9831 0.9592 0.8699 0.8747 0.8751
A 0.0005 ± 2E-5 0.0014 ± 1E-5 0.0024 ± 3E-5 0.0031 ± 5E-5 0.0030 ± 4E-5 0.0030 ± 4E-5 0.0030 ± 4E-5
B 0.3414 ± 0.0018 0.4024 ± 0.0035 0.5294 ± 0.0096 0.7490 ± 0.025 1.1900 ± 0.046 1.1720 ± 0.045 1.1700 ± 0.045
C 21.660 ± 0.10 13.970 ± 0.14 15.040 ± 0.37 25.000 ± 1.1 38.600 ± 3.6 36.400 ± 3.4 36.400 ± 3.4
FAG at odd positions
D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R2 0.341 0.9973 0.9948 0.9724 0.9891 0.9919 0.9873
A / 0.0014 ± 8E-6 0.0024 ± 2E-5 0.0031 ± 4E-5 0.0031 ± 1E-5 0.0031 ± 1E-5 0.0031 ± 1E-5
B / 0.4021 ± 0.0028 0.5518 ± 0.0058 0.8350 ± 0.024 1.4860 ± 0.020 1.4734 ± 0.018 1.4700 ± 0.023
C / 14.050 ± 0.11 14.210 ± 0.21 20.710 ± 0.95 18.470 ± 0.84 16.840 ± 0.69 16.910 ± 0.87
FOP at even positions
D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R2 0.9982 0.9938 0.9888 0.9444 0.9892 0.1241 0.8755
A 0.0108 ± 4E-5 0.0255 ± 0.0002 0.0601 ± 0.0005 0.1268 ± 0.0034 0.217 ± 0.019 0.0097 ± 0.0002 0.0114 ± 0.0003
B 0.3105 ± 0.0018 0.3607 ± 0.0039 0.4290 ± 0.0085 0.4700 ± 0.013 1.197 ± 0.068 2.5400 ± 0.58 0.6680 ± 0.034
C 41.540 ± 0.15 32.860 ± 0.26 57.020 ± 0.83 162.10 ± 5.9 148E+2 ± 62E+2 440.00 ± 29 13.000 ± 1.0
FOP at odd positions
D 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
R2 0.9983 0.9933 0.9883 0.9456 0.9917 0.8524 0.663
A 0.0108 ± 4E-3 0.0255 ± 0.0002 0.0601 ± 0.0005 0.1266 ± 0.0033 0.233.0 ± 0.022 0.0112 ± 0.0002 /
B 0.3086 ± 0.0018 0.3607 ± 0.0040 0.4284 ± 0.0085 0.4690 ± 0.013 1.234.0 ± 0.067 1.0740 ± 0.037 /
C 41.580 ± 0.14 32.930 ± 0.27 56.960 ± 0.83 161.30 ± 5.8 194E+2 ± 84E+2 206.00 ± 12 /
FIG. 5: Values of parameters obtained by fitting a log-normal
curve to the agent- and opinion-profile-based D-curves for the
case M = 3. The filled dots represent the values for an even
number of agents, the open dots for odd numbers. For the
agent-based values, a linear scale is used; for the opinion-
profile-values, a logarithmic scale.
profile data, the initial trend of parameter A is exponen-
tial linear on the log-scale); this only changes at D = 6.
For parameters B and C, the initial behavior in terms
of D increasingly deviates from linearity (or exponential
behavior in the opinion profile case). Though suggestive,
the number of data points is insufficient to predict the
shape of D-curves for higher values of M .
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